[Essay] The Real Problems of Deepfakes
The Real Problems of Deepfakes
Deepfakes—defined by machine-learning
experts Yisroel Mirsky and Wenke Lee as “content generated by an artificial intelligence,
that is authentic in the eyes of a human being,” particularly “the generation
and manipulation of human imagery”—have become increasingly popular in recent
years. They rely on the rapidly developing technology of “deep learning.” Deep
learning is, essentially, the process of a computer teaching itself new
information through trial and error. In the case of deepfakes, the computer is
teaching itself how human faces look and how they can be manipulated. Deepfakes
have “lower[ed] the technological barriers required to create high-quality
manipulations” (Lutz & Bassett). Their ease of access lends well to any
individual or group seeking to create a time- and cost-efficient video for what
is often a malicious purpose. Because of these malicious uses, it would be
smart to place regulations on deepfakes. Before we can do this, we first need a
way to reliably detect deepfakes with an automated process.
Lindsey Wilkerson of the University
of Missouri states that “the first viral deepfake was a pornographic video…
first posted on the social media website Reddit by a user named ‘deepfakes.’” Some
say this is where the technology got its name, while others say the user’s name
was to showcase what he does. Regardless, this post set a precedent for
deepfakes to be used maliciously, and the malicious uses would only grow more
problematic as the technology advanced. Wilkerson explains that, due to the
huge increase in misinformation surrounding the 2020 Presidential election,
several social media websites began to limit deepfakes on their platforms. “YouTube
announced that it would not ‘allow election related deepfake videos’… Facebook
put out a statement that it had ‘strengthen[ed]’ its policies ‘toward
misleading manipulated videos…identified as deepfakes,’” and “Twitter and
Pornhub…completely banned the publication of deepfakes” (Wilkerson). With
nearly every major social media platform claiming to prohibit deepfakes, it’s
safe to assume they have a sure-fire way to tell when something is or is not a
deepfake. But is that truly the case? Is there a chance that a deepfake can
still slip through? How are they even detecting deepfakes?
One
popular method for deepfake detection that these social media sites might be using
is the “analytic” method. Lutz and Bassett describe this method as a “promising
technique for detecting deepfakes” by “finding head pose inconsistencies in
modified images.” They go on to explain that “post estimates contain enough
information to identify unique individuals.” What does all that mean? Well, the
analytic method is the process of having an AI referred to as “the analytic” compare
a deepfaked video of a person to an authentic video of that same person. In
comparing the two videos, the analytic can see a difference in body and head
movement. The analytic “computes two 3D head pose estimates, one using only the
central region of the face and the other its entirety, and using various
features derived from these head poses classifies an image as either
manipulated or authentic” (Lutz & Bassett). The
image below depicts how the analytic is able to analyze 3D facial features and
track them, regardless of anything obstructing the face (such as the hands in
the image). Notice how the analytic estimates that the woman on the right is
smiling despite her mouth not being visible. It makes this estimation based on other
facial features, like slightly raised eyebrows, squinted eyes, and wrinkles
around the mouth.
(Lutz & Bassett) |
All the estimations performed by the analytic allow it to detect deepfakes with “high accuracy,” according to Lutz and Bassett. However, “high accuracy” is not explicitly defined and does not mean 100% accuracy. This means that there is still a chance that a malicious deepfake will slip through and be published online. Even worse is that, because this deepfake slipped past the analytic, it will likely be a very convincing deepfake to humans as well.
The capabilities of the analytic
are not going to be enough. Matthew Bodi cites “deepfake pioneer” Dr. Hao Li as
saying in 2019 that “deepfakes that appear ‘perfectly real’ will be accessible
to everyday people in ‘six months to a year.’” Though that time has passed and
deepfakes aren’t quite at the point that Dr. Hao Li predicted, there is still a
more relevant and somewhat worrying statistic: Bodi states that “between 2018
and 2019, the number of deepfake videos on the internet doubled.” If deepfake
production continues to grow as rapidly as it did in 2019, and if deepfakes do
eventually become as accessible as Dr. Hao Li thought, then social media
platforms will be overwhelmed with deepfakes. The analytic and any other
methods being used to detect and combat deepfakes will be unable to keep up as
deepfakes become more convincing and more accessible.
A solid solution to the malicious
use of deepfakes needs to be implemented. As of now, the regulation of
deepfakes is only being done on a small-scale with the platforms affected
needing to do their own regulating. The ability to create a deepfake is
currently available—in some cases for free—to anyone who wants it. The free
deepfakes aren’t going to fool anyone, but, again, Dr. Hao Li predicts that the
easily accessible deepfakes will progress to the point of being “perfectly
real.” While it’s good that the companies most worried about and affected by
malicious deepfakes are attempting to prevent them, it shouldn’t be their sole
responsibility. Free deepfakes, for the most part, are of a low enough quality
that they aren’t convincing, and they almost always include a watermark that
gives it away. Paid usage is more of a concern and needs some form of
regulation as well. Perhaps there should be some sort of certification required
before licenses to these programs can be purchased. Such limitations won’t
entirely solve the problem of malicious deepfakes, but they would at least slow
things down and give the deepfake detection algorithms—and the people making
them—some breathing room.
Works Cited
Bodi, Matthew. “The First Amendment
Implications of Regulating Political Deepfakes.” Rutgers Computer &
Technology Law Journal, vol. 47, no. 1, Jan. 2021, pp. 143–172. EBSCOhost,
search-ebscohost-com.libprox1.slcc.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lgh&AN=148437014&site=eds-live&scope=site.
Campbell, Colin, et al. “Preparing
for an Era of Deepfakes and AI-Generated Ads: A Framework for Understanding
Responses to Manipulated Advertising.” Journal of Advertising, Apr. 2021, pp.
1–17. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1080/00913367.2021.1909515.
Lutz, Kevin, and Robert Bassett.
DeepFake Detection with Inconsistent Head Poses: Reproducibility and Analysis.
2021. EBSCOhost,
search-ebscohost-com.libprox1.slcc.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsarx&AN=edsarx.2108.12715&site=eds-live&scope=site.
Mirsky, Yisroel, and Wenke Lee.
“The Creation and Detection of Deepfakes: A Survey.” ACM Computing Surveys,
vol. 54, no. 1, Jan. 2021, pp. 1–41. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1145/3425780.
Wilkerson, Lindsey. “Still Waters
Run Deep(Fakes): The Rising Concerns of ‘Deepfake’ Technology and Its Influence
on Democracy and the First Amendment.” Missouri Law Review, vol. 86, no. 1,
Winter 2021, pp. 407–432. EBSCOhost,
search-ebscohost-com.libprox1.slcc.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=150897210&site=eds-live&scope=site.
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